THE CENTRE FOR BREXIT POLICY

Executive Summary

- The Centre for Brexit Policy is a new think tank backed by cross-party politicians and veterans of the national Brexit debate. It has been formed to propose the critical policy changes enabled by Brexit that will boost national prosperity and well-being in years to come, as well as help ensure that Britain fully ‘takes back control’ when it leaves the European Union.

- The CBP aspires to trigger a deep and wide debate about what Brexit should mean for the UK over the next decade or two. By providing a focus for the development of post-Brexit public policy, the CBP hopes to help formulate an overarching framework for the UK that maximises the opportunities Brexit affords.

- Thus, the CBP will aim to perform a role similar to that played by the Centre for Policy Studies when it helped pioneer the controversial reforms of the British economy implemented by Margaret Thatcher’s government of the 1980s.

- Former Cabinet minister Owen Paterson will chair the CBP, backed by a cross-party team of directors including Labour MP Graham Stringer, DUP MP Sammy Wilson and former Brexit Party MEP Matthew Patten. John Longworth, former Director General of the British Chambers of Commerce, will be responsible for day-to-day management jointly with Senior Adviser Edgar Miller, also Convener of Economists for Free Trade.

- CBP plans to appoint a broad supporting cadre of expert CBP Fellows drawn from multiple disciplines to provide additional expertise and experience in developing an agenda for policy change that will ensure the British people benefit from Brexit. CBP Fellows already appointed include economist Roger Bootle, trade expert Michael Burrage, energy expert Dr John Constable, Professor of Oncology Angus Dalgleish, Barrister Martin Howe QC, economist Dr Ruth Lea, economist Professor Patrick Minford, financial services lawyer Barnabas Reynolds, science and environmental expert Lord Ridley, and historian Professor Robert Tombs. More appointments will be made as the CBP evolves its agenda.

- Additional support will be provided by a CBP Business Forum that will bring a business perspective to shaping CBP’s agenda, provide input to policy proposals, and deliver a pro-Brexit business voice.

- CBP already has plans to roll out a number of policy papers this year; but with the coronavirus crisis eclipsing all other policy matters and triggering unprecedented help by government for beleaguered British firms, CBP will concentrate initially on how coronavirus will affect our exit from the EU and how the UK can best position itself in the Brexit negotiations.

- A constant theme of the CBP will be showing how global free trade should be employed to support the Consumer rather than aiding protectionist producers. In the longer-term, the CBP will address such areas as deregulation, tax reform, national productivity, rebalancing government spending, and energy policy. In parallel, the CBP expects to support ministers as they pursue a Canada-style free trade deal with Brussels and negotiate a future relationship that restores Britain’s status as a sovereign, self-governing, independent nation.
The great liberal historian H A L Fisher is supposed to have concluded that history was no more than “one damned thing after another.” Or, more elegantly, that it was governed by “the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.” Few of us are wholly satisfied by such thin gruel: we want, especially when trying to understand great public events, to think that history has a meaning, and that things happen for deeper reasons than the ambitions or errors of individual politicians and officials, or slogans on the sides of buses. Few arguments are more powerful than those that confidently enlist the forces of history on their side: thus, Brexit is wrong because a united Europe is inevitable; or Brexit is right because our ancient political culture makes Brussels power unacceptable.

European federalism has always made use of deterministic historical argument. Integration was the wave of the future, hence those who opposed it were “nostalgic” for a dead past, and had to be educated by their enlightened leaders to embrace the inevitable: “We have made Europe”, wrote a leading French politician; “now we have to make Europeans.”

We should be wary of this kind of historical determinism, whoever uses it, for it seeks to constrain our choices by telling us that only one future is conceivable. It also, as we have seen, tends to polarize and envenom political debate.

So let us try to get away from competing pseudo-histories and attempt a rational analysis. In trying to decide how Brexit fits into history, we are really asking two slightly different questions which have considerably different answers. First, why did the UK leave the EU? Second, why did the UK leave the EU in 2016-19? The first question may indeed involve long-term developments, even going back centuries. The second will bring in “the play of the contingent”, even the slogan on the bus. Both questions are relevant, indeed indispensable, for trying to understand what has happened.

Were we always destined to leave the EU because “ever closer union” was incompatible with our long history? Brexiteers may like to think so, but the evidence is less than compelling. We voted in 1975 by a sizeable majority to stay in. If David Cameron had negotiated more successfully in 2015, it might have tipped the balance towards remaining. And if we had adopted the Euro, as Tony Blair and business lobbies had wanted, is it not almost inevitable that we would have voted to remain? Not because of a sudden love for the EU, but because of the financial risks that tie Eurozone countries to the system however much they suffer.

In 2016 we voted to leave by only a small majority, and a succession of polls over three years showed that the country was deeply divided. So if European integration was indeed incompatible with our history, half of us failed to realize it. Indeed, part of the country, and a powerful part, did all it could to cling on the EU, even at the risk of a constitutional crisis—a subject to which I shall return.

Are we so different, then, from other Europeans? Not in our sentiments about the EU. Neutral polling in June 2016 (days before our referendum) showed that the EU was as unpopular in the
Netherlands, Germany and Spain as in Britain, much more unpopular in France, and hugely more unpopular in Greece.

Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference between ourselves and our neighbours. In most of Continental Europe, dissatisfaction with the EU often means wanting it to be more effective, even more interventionist, whereas in Britain, of course, it means the opposite: “less Europe” and even “no Europe”, rather than “more Europe”. Opinion polls over the years have shown this consistently. If we look back before the post-referendum turbulence, the UK was the country in which fewest people—only 6 percent—wanted more power to be given to Brussels; whereas in France and Spain (where more people than in Britain expressed “unfavourable” views of the EU) over 30 percent wanted it to be more centralized. Far fewer people in Britain (only 5 percent) felt “more European than national”, and fewer wanted the European flag to fly on public buildings. Finally, Britain was the only member country in which a majority felt more confident in facing the future outside than inside the EU. The obvious conclusion—well before the referendum brought the issue to the fore—was that people in Britain were less emotionally committed to the “European project”.

These sharp differences in feelings and world view are evidently the results of a different history. It is helpful to take a few steps back and trace our relationship with the idea and reality of European federalism. Federalism had, and has, two main motives. First, the wish to prevent war in Europe; second, the wish to create a great European power. Both go back roughly a century, beginning in the 1920s, and revived in the 1950s.

Supranational systems, federalists believed, would ensure peace. Nation states and national identities were an obstacle, even an evil, bringing war and division. This was a misreading of history. Both world wars were caused not by popular nationalism, but by the perverse decisions of authoritarian elites. Neither Hitler nor Mussolini (let alone Stalin) had been elected by a majority; and war was deeply unpopular, even in Hitler’s Reich. Healthy democracy, not supranational bureaucracy, is the true guardian of peace.

The wish to enhance European power is linked to the perception of a declining Continent, and to the rise of other major powers, originally the United States and the USSR. Though it was at first assumed on all sides that Britain was too global a power to be involved, some of the earliest federalists were British imperialists who accepted colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain’s 1902 dictum that “The days are for great Empires and not for little States.” Little states offended all who thought in terms of rationality, order and power rather than of disorderly democracy: these included diplomats, administrators, economists and academics of right and left. They also offended those who saw the outside world as a threat that could only be resisted by size. The latest avatar is Guy Verhofstadt, echoing Chamberlain: “the world of tomorrow is a world of Empires.”

Europe experienced a barely precedent cycle of horrors: war, defeat, occupation, civil war, dictatorship and—perhaps even longer lasting—a sense of moral catastrophe and shame. General de Gaulle, although a symbol of French resistance, thought that his country’s leaders had “sold its soul”. The idea of a united Europe therefore appealed not only to a longing for security and prosperity, but for a psychological escape from past failures, even past crimes. Former dictatorships—Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece—and newly escaped subject peoples of the Communist empire saw Europe as a proof of their emancipation and a safeguard against the return of a frightening past. To be “European” was to be free and modern—worth paying a huge price for.

The twentieth century was experienced very differently in Britain. However great the traumas, Britain had emerged victorious and with a sense of national pride and vindication, and at the same time a realization that it had survived with the support of countries outside a hostile or defeated
Europe. For Britain, European integration had nothing to do with past horrors, and everything to do with a sudden fear of a declining future.

In the 1950s and 60s its political elites were assailed by a tide of pessimism about the country and about themselves. Loss of empire seemed to threaten Britain with becoming one of Chamberlain’s “little States”. Its economy seemed in decline. Its institutions and those who ran them were mocked as archaic, decadent, even ridiculous. Britain, said a prime ministerial advisor, was “the sinking Titanic”, and Europe its lifeboat. Outside the European Community, wrote Sir Con O’Neill, chief official negotiator, we would be merely “a Greater Sweden”.

So we joined, rather duplicitously: hoping that “Europe” would be a substitute for lost empire, while pretending that it was no more than a trading association whose commitment to “ever closer union” was empty rhetoric.

The simplest explanation for Brexit would be that these perceptions and realities changed. On one hand, the EU was determined to move towards genuine political federation—the only way it could survive, according to President Macron. On the other, Britain no longer needed a lifeboat, and even if it had, an economically and politically floundering EU was not it. There were several landmarks on this route: Margaret Thatcher’s clashes with the socialist Commission President Jacques Delors (which tilted the Conservative Party towards Euroscepticism and Labour towards Europhilia); Britain’s decision not to adopt the Euro; and the Eurozone’s manifest economic and social failings, turning Britain into the employer of last resort for southern and eastern European youth. Hence, the majority view in Britain—unique in the EU—that we could face the future better outside.

If Britain’s uneasy relationship with European integration goes back to the 1960s, and even at a stretch to the 1920s, is there a longer history too? Certainly, even if it is one that Remainers have mocked as “nostalgia for a world where passports were blue, faces were white and the map was coloured imperial pink.” From the 18th century onwards, the new United Kingdom turned outwards from being a clutch of weak coastal European kingdoms to a dynamic global trader and power. This is of course a vast story, during which profound economic, demographic, cultural and political changes took place which still operate centuries later. For example, the commercial pattern in which Britain runs a deficit with Europe and a surplus with the rest of the world already existed in the 19th century. Britain was far less economically integrated with the EU than its other members.

More broadly, we can only guess at the psychological difference caused by having most of the world speaking our language, and having old-established global relationships such as the Commonwealth and the alliance with the United States. The idea of “global Britain” is simply more feasible and meaningful than would be (let us say) “global Poland” or even “global Germany”. It may also prove a more realistic plan for the future than integration into a troubled EU.

Does even older history contribute to Brexit too? I would say a cautious yes. Brexiteers argue that a strong sense of parliamentary government and the ancient practices of the Common Law separate us from the procedures of the EU. But the history of the last two years shows that Members of Parliament themselves and the Supreme Court did not share this view, and indeed pseudo-historical claims about “parliamentary sovereignty” were actually used to try to block or neuter Brexit. Moreover, we should not forget that while some EU states have recent and shallow democratic traditions, others have their own ancient and proud histories of struggles for independence and democracy which so far they find compatible with European federalism—but that is another subject.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that at the very least we have a national story that has nourished Brexit. This we might call the “Magna Carta myth”: the idea that when fundamental choices have to be made, it is the people who decide, and the rulers who must obey.

Some of our leading European neighbours have very different national stories. France was the creation of monarchs, emperors and revolutionary minorities. Germany and Italy were established in the 19th century by a combination of visionary ideologists and autocratic politicians: “we have made Italy, now we have to make Italians”, said one—a task still not complete after 150 years. In these countries, the people, if they were consulted at all, were merely summoned to accept and approve what their enlightened elites had done: active authority, passive democracy. This still colours the political practices of the EU, as France, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy and Greece have all discovered. But it is not how we instinctively think of our own politics, and events since 2016 have emphasised the dogged determination of British voters to be obeyed. How much European anger at Brexit is a result of the embarrassing contrast?

But what about the others—the 48 percent who voted Remain? They clearly did not see—and many still do not see—our history in the way I have outlined it. So, either I and other Brexiteers are wrong in our understanding of history, or Remainers have placed themselves outside that history, whether by indifference or choice.

For some, it is clearly by choice: those ideological Remainers who vehemently reject Britishness or Englishness, whether because they reject national identity or because they espouse nationalism—Scottish, Irish or Welsh. Other Remainers seemed motivated more by personal or corporate interest—business lobbies, politicians, academics, diplomats etc.—or by a conviction of belonging to a social and intellectual elite in conflict with an ignorant and prejudiced majority. Underlying this are years of Europeanization and/or globalization, which have created important trans-national interest groups and also produced what has been called a “void” in democratic national politics.

But most Remainers were simply motivated by economic worries, fanned by an interminable Project Fear, which promised inevitable economic disaster as a result of Brexit. These fears are similar to those deployed in other EU countries. In our case there is a further element: every Remain strand also draws on the post-imperial declinism referred to earlier, which sees Britain as a weak and impotent satellite of the EU, and even wants it to be. Though the ideological minority of this Remain coalition is irreconcilable, most is based on short-term calculations and fears, and is likely to fade. Doubly so if I am right in seeing it as contrary to major historical trends.

Despite three years of political turmoil and unsettling cultural conflict, the decision has been made and confirmed. There is no doubt that it is historic, for both the United Kingdom and Europe. Of the two determinist narratives I have sketched—that European integration is the inevitable future, or that British history demands that we assert our independence—one will prove to have been an illusion. But history does not determine the future—not, at least, in any way that we can discern, otherwise predicting it would be easy.

But one prediction does seem secure. We shall loosen our relationship with our nearest neighbours, and strengthen our links with the wider world. As I have suggested, this renews a three-century global history, and if it succeeds, it might suggest that nearly a half a century of European integration was an aberration. But half a century is too long a time to be dismissed as a mere mistake: rather, we might conclude that our very long history—nearly 2,000 years of it—has been of oscillating relationships with the near continent, and that our uneasy attempt to be at “the heart of Europe” has been one more episode, alongside Plantagenet ambitions to be Holy Roman Emperors and Kings of France.
Brexit was a vote of confidence in the ability of the nation to survive and prosper in an uncertain world. If it is to be more than a defiant gesture, it must galvanize society and government to make us a country in which citizens are not despised, ignored or abandoned as surplus to requirements. If we succeed, we shall, in Pitt’s words, have saved ourselves by our exertions, and we may save Europe by our example.

But this is suddenly being tested by an unpredicted crisis. So far, across Europe, the nation-states are acting, while the EU is faltering.

Robert Tombs is a Fellow of the Centre for Brexit Policy, and he is writing a book called Offshore Island.
Boris Johnson’s government has pulled off the spectacular triple of agreeing an ‘acceptable’ Withdrawal Agreement, winning a stunning election victory leading to political stability, and achieving an ‘official’ exit from the EU. Now, after years of Parliamentary delay, dither and downright chicanery, the Withdrawal Act is the law of the land. And we have a pro-Brexit government with a seemingly impregnable majority.

So, is the Brexit battle now over? With the passage of the Withdrawal Act, has the Government delivered on its pledge to ‘get Brexit done’? Can the country turn its mind and its energies to other things? What of the promises made to voters who ‘loaned their votes’, giving the government five years of power?

WHY DO WE NEED A NEW THINK TANK?

Clearly, the UK has taken its first and almost certainly irrevocable steps on its voyage beyond the boundaries of the European Union. Some landmarks can be identified – the return of full control over immigration, the right to strike free trade deals across the globe, and no more payments of almost £20 billion a year for EU membership. And the new government has brought in a fresh wind of change in its attitude toward trade negotiations.

But much of what lays ahead remains shrouded in mist. It is therefore our contention that many critical questions remain largely unsettled. Brexit is a process, not an event.

Unanswered Questions

Jacques Delors, the European Commission president who first revealed the scale of the EU’s ambitions, famously said some 30 years ago that the day would come when 80 per cent of the UK’s laws would be made in Brussels. He was not wrong.

Today, the EU’s body of law (the Acquis Communautaire) runs to 700,000 pages and more than 50,000 laws have been introduced in the UK since Delors made his forecast. There is scarcely a nook or cranny of national life that is not in some way impacted by EU rules and regulations. Are we going to keep some or all these 50,000 laws? Which ones should we discard? Which ones should we reform? Which ones should we strengthen? How should we decide?

But if Brexit were simply a matter of ploughing through 700,000 pages and sorting the wheat from the chaff, it would be simple (if laborious). The fundamental questions Brexit poses go deeper than a gargantuan pruning exercise and are not limited to just defining our trading relationship with the EU during the 2020 transition year.

First and foremost, the government must find a way of quashing an immediate and everlasting threat to UK sovereignty stemming from hastily agreed clauses in the Withdrawal Agreement (particularly the Northern Ireland Protocol) and the Political Declaration. These clauses, as currently drafted, will prevent the restoration of full national sovereignty and the ending of the European Court of Justice’s supremacy over our laws.

More broadly, will we be operating as of next January in near orbit around Brussels? Or will there be a more detached relationship in which we distance ourselves from the reams of rules and
regulations of the nascent EU superstate that has come to govern us over the past fifty years? Friends we surely will be with the EU27. But what will be the shape of that friendship?

In parallel, we must address the same questions with the rest of the world. Will we be closer to America’s view of the world or that of Paris and Berlin as mediated by Brussels? What will be our stance towards the emerging superpowers of China (think Huawei) and India? How will we relate to our traditional Commonwealth partners of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada – as well as Japan and the rapidly growing countries of Southeast Asia?

Freed from the pressures of EU foreign policy, what will be our relationship with Russia? What will be our attitude towards the Middle East? Africa?

Do we want a bigger army, navy and air force and the ability to project military force in far-flung quarters of the world? Or do we see ourselves as a second-rank power chiefly concerned with guarding our own borders and allying with others in times of peril? What should be our stance with regard to EU foreign and defence policies versus our traditional ties with NATO? What level of integration, if any, do we want to accept with the growing structures of the EU Defence Union?

It is often said that “you campaign in poetry and govern in prose”. Nowhere is this more true than with post-Brexit domestic policy.

Will the government’s central thrust be to provide choice to the Consumer and lower their cost of living? Or will we - like the EU - continue to defend protectionism? Will we align ourselves with EU farming directives to protect producers or will we import ‘chlorinated chicken’ to provide consumers a choice?

What new policies should be adopted to exploit the potential of Brexit to make the UK more prosperous and enhance national well being? How can Brexit help in ‘levelling up’ those voters who lent their votes in the last election?

Is there something inherently wrong with becoming a ‘Singapore-on-Thames’ with a smaller state, lower taxes and thoughtful control over public spending? Or do we see ourselves as a more muscular version of Sweden where state spending accounts for half of national output? Of course, the coronavirus crisis distorts this question but ultimately it must be answered.

Can new post-Brexit freedoms be employed to promote better well being at the local level? Could an innovative balance between national and local taxation, including VAT, be found that would enhance local autonomy and flexibility? Can gaining control over such areas as immigration, state aid, and fishing rights deliver tangible benefits to local communities?

Over the years of our EU membership, our political leaders increasingly have shied away from such big and difficult questions, preferring to shuffle them off into the committee rooms of the Berlaymont. No more. Brexit means that ministers are going to have to earn their keep, not shelter behind the skirts of Brussels.

The central issue is, what will change after Brexit and what will stay the same? The government has had little time to think about tomorrow, let alone detail its plans.
Unprecedented Challenge for Government

The government is facing an unprecedented challenge in both answering these questions and delivering on its commitments, many of which must be resolved in less than nine months. Even before coronavirus these challenges were unprecedented in their complexity, in the wide range of required decisions and actions, in technical detail, and in the shortness of available time. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that such a challenge has not been faced since the last world war. Moreover, the EU believes it holds all the cards and is gearing up to take a tough, uncompromising approach to negotiations.

Finally, the forces of the Remain establishment still exist in Whitehall, in Parliament, the media and in business lobby groups. Despite the clear message of the election, the government is already facing strong pushback from protectionist business lobbies, as well as from some of its own civil servants. These attitudes need to be constantly rebutted and the government’s pro-Brexit instincts supported.

In 2016, many Leave campaigners assumed the job had been done and dropped the ball. It is essential that this mistake is not repeated in 2020. The government must be prepared, in every sense, to exit on a proper basis at the end of 2020.

Consequently, we have concluded there is a pressing need for a new think tank dedicated to furthering implementation of the Brexit that voters have demanded on four separate occasions. This requires supporting the government in delivering a ‘real’ Brexit, providing in-depth policy proposals that capitalise on the advantages created by Brexit, and ultimately holding the government to account.

This is the role of the Centre for Brexit Policy (CBP).

CBP – UNIQUELY FOCUSED ON MAKING BREXIT A SUCCESS

‘Get Brexit done’ was a brilliant slogan. Now is the time to establish what it means.

The Centre for Brexit Policy has been created by people from across the political spectrum to provide answers to such questions as posed above. It will develop policies that ensure a better future for all our people and support government in implementing a real Brexit.

In confronting such questions and suggesting answers, the CBP aspires to trigger a deep and wide debate about what Brexit should mean for Britain over the next decade or two. By providing a focus for the development of post-Brexit public policy, the CBP hopes to help formulate an overarching framework for the UK that maximises the opportunities Brexit affords. This will be promoted to government, Parliamentarians, and within public discourse - welcoming contributions from fair-minded people of all stripes who want to see Brexit open a new and fruitful chapter in our country’s life.

The ultimate measure of success will be the adoption of policies by government that maximise the benefits of Brexit and furthers national autonomy and independence. The CBP aspires to influence post-Brexit policy in the same manner as Keith Joseph achieved with the Centre for Policy Studies, as Antony Fisher, Ralph Harris, and Arthur Seldon did with the IEA, and as Rodney Leach provided with Business for Sterling.
We hope, by the end of 2020, CBP will be recognised as having influence on government decision-making and might be considered as a ‘go to’ organisation for comment on Brexit and post-Brexit policy.

Objectives

CBP has three core objectives:

1. Identify the opportunities and benefits of Brexit across the full spectrum of economic, trade, social, foreign, defence and security policy areas proposing new policies for the government’s agenda

2. Continue to make the intellectual, evidence-based case for a ‘real’ Brexit and provide the government with clear and constructive advice on how to deal with ongoing Brexit negotiation and implementation issues. By ‘real’ Brexit, we mean regaining full control over our laws, borders, seas, trade, and courts, regardless of the route taken to achieve these.

3. Check any attempts to dilute a real Brexit, as well as serving as a catalyst and rallying point for positive stories that, over time, will be able to persuade and demonstrate the many substantial advantages of Brexit

Delivery of these objectives will be based on professional, fact-based, substantive research by experts in their fields leading to authoritative reports, short papers, OpEds, events, and briefing meetings – both within and without government.

Positioning

CBP will be non-party political and will work with experts and politicians of all political persuasions and none, if they are committed to the mission of a successful Brexit. More specifically, the CBP will position itself as:

- Adopting a wide-ranging focus on government policy across all policy areas – not limited to just economic or social policy
- Being 100 per cent behind a successful Brexit that delivers on making the UK the best country in the world including such national interests as regaining independent control of fishing rights and maintaining the City as an independent global financial centre
- Favouring global free trade and the interest of the Consumer versus protectionists
- Supportive of a comprehensive FTA with the EU with no ‘level playing field’ restrictions - but equally supportive of an exit under WTO rules if an acceptable FTA cannot be negotiated
- Focused on the importance of parallel negotiations with non-EU countries, particularly the United States

In step with the positive approach of the Prime Minister, the CBP will actively radiate realistic positivity and optimism about the future following Brexit.

Structure/Leadership

CBP is a non-charitable, non-party political company limited by guarantee. It will be led by a non-party-political pro-Brexit team, seasoned in all aspects of policy development, experienced in campaigning for and effecting new policies, and with a deep understanding of and close connections with government, Parliament, Whitehall, and the media.
Former Cabinet minister Owen Paterson will chair the CBP backed by a cross-party team of directors including Labour MP Graham Stringer, DUP MP Sammy Wilson and former Brexit Party MEP Matthew Patten. In addition, businessman John Longworth, former Director General of the British Chambers of Commerce, will be the Executive Director responsible for day-to-day management jointly with Senior Adviser Edgar Miller, also Convener of Economists for Free Trade.

CBP Fellows/Business Forum

CBP plans to appoint a broad supporting cadre of expert CBP Fellows drawn from multiple disciplines to provide additional expertise and experience in developing an agenda for policy change and authoritative papers that will provide the framework for the British people benefiting from Brexit.

CBP Fellows already appointed include economist Roger Bootle, trade expert Michael Burrage, energy expert Dr John Constable, Professor of Oncology Angus Dalgleish, Barrister Martin Howe QC, economist Dr Ruth Lea, economist Professor Patrick Minford, financial services lawyer Barnabas Reynolds, science and environmental expert Lord Ridley and historian Professor Robert Tombs. More appointments will be made as the CBP evolves its agenda.

In addition, John Longworth will chair a CBP Business Forum that will bring business perspective to shaping CBP’s agenda, setting policy, and deliver a pro-Brexit business voice.

These expert resources will play a key role in identifying and formulating the policies that CBP will promote.

End Products

Although the ultimate end product of CBP is the adoption of its proposals and policies by government, CBP recognises that coordinated messaging to multiple audiences is required to effect change.

To achieve this, CBP will mount a coordinated programme of major policy papers supported by associated op-eds, news articles, media appearances and interviews, targeted events, and informal briefing meetings/lunches/dinners with policymakers and opinion influencers. This will be reinforced by an ongoing, proactive public affairs effort underpinned by both traditional public relations and the use of social media.

CBP’s priorities will reflect a strategic rather than tactical perspective.

Unique Capabilities

CBP will be the only UK think tank with the following collective attributes:

- A singular focus on Brexit, its successful implementation, and its implications for government policy across all policy areas
- A deep understanding of and close connections with government, Parliament, Whitehall, and the media
- Flexibility to produce, promote, and campaign without constraints for solidly researched, evidence-based policy initiatives
- An extensive network providing access to prominent and respected multi-disciplinary experts drawn from the worlds of business, academia, politics, government, and elsewhere.
FUTURE POLICY DIRECTIONS

The CBP already has plans to roll out a number of policy papers this year; but with the coronavirus crisis eclipsing all other policy matters and triggering unprecedented help by government for beleaguered British firms, CBP will concentrate initially on how coronavirus will affect the exit from the EU and how the UK can best position itself in the Brexit negotiations.

Other papers in the CBP pipeline include ideas, for example, for ‘leveling up’ the North and other regions, explaining how the EU’s unlevel playing field has enhanced its apparent competitiveness contributing to immense positive trade balances, freeing the NHS from the crippling constraints created by our 47-year membership of the EU, and how post-Brexit freedoms can provide more fiscal headroom for investment, spending, and reducing taxes. A constant theme will be showing how global free trade should be employed to support the Consumer rather than aiding protectionist producers. In the medium-term, the CBP will address such areas as deregulation, tax reform, national productivity, rebalancing government spending, and energy policy.

With the Government committed to a clean break with the EU once the transition period is over, the CBP expects to support ministers as they pursue a Canada-style free trade deal with Brussels and negotiate a future relationship that restores Britain's status as a sovereign, self-governing, outward-looking independent nation.